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ne of the first lessons learned in
school is that good work will
lead to gold stars, stickers, or
smiley-faces. Generations of
teachers have routinely—and sometimes
simplistically—assumed that the right in-
centive will boost student motivation and
performance.
Ironically, teachers have resisted at-
tempts to link rewards or sanctions to their
own performance. Although policymakers
have often advocated pay for performance,
classroom practitioners have argued that
judging performance is inherently subjec-
tive and that teachers do not completely
control student learning. Instead, they have
favored a uniform salary schedule while de-
fining accountability in terms of dedication
and hard work.
Today, both policymakers and educa-
tors are taking a new look at incentives.
State accountability systems usually include
a role for rewards or sanctions, though ac-
tual implementation has been slow. Twenty
states offer teachers some form of reward
when achievement rises, but only one con-
siders student performance data in teacher
evaluation. In addition, fourteen states pro-
vide for the takeover or reconstitution of
low-performing schools, though few have
acted on this option (Ulrich Boser 2001).
For their part, some teacher unions have
signaled a willingness to consider adding
performance factors to compensation sys-
tems (Jeff Archer 2001).
This Digest examines the role of re-
wards and sanctions in school reform and
identifies key issues in implementing incen-
tive systems.
What Role Do Incentives Play in
Today’s Accountability Systems?
The new accountability is based on
five linked components (James Watts and
others 1998). First, carefully designed stan-
dards set the targets for achievement, and
assessments aligned to the standards deter-
mine how well the standards are being met.
Incentives provide rewards or sanctions
based on success in achieving the stan-
dards, while results are publicly reported.
Finally, professional development enhances
practitioner skills to meet program goals.
In this system, incentives provide the
motivational fuel for change. Drawing on a
behaviorist view that is controversial among
educators but that many Americans view as
common sense, accountability theorists ar-
gue that rewards and sanctions give
practitioners a personal stake in the success
of their students, leading them to focus their
energies on that goal. Moreover, incentives
give credibility to standards by backing the
organization’s rhetoric with tangible conse-
quences (Larry Lashway 2001).
In practice, however, implementation
has often been snagged by political resis-
tance or practical details, and the motiva-
tional effects of incentives remain unclear,
with virtually no evidence that simply dan-
gling a few carrots or sticks in front of
teachers will galvanize them into the enthu-
siastic pursuit of standards. In a study of
North Carolina’s performance-compensa-
tion system, Henry Johnson and colleagues
(1999) concluded that bonuses had a posi-
tive effect as one element in a comprehen-
sive accountability system, but were not
viewed by teachers as major incentives.
How Are Rewards Provided to
Teachers?
The idea of paying teachers for perfor-
mance has a long and not very successful
history. Despite the persistent public appeal
of “merit pay,” teachers continue to be paid
mostly by the uniform salary schedule that
recognizes only education and experience.
Where merit pay has been tried, it has usu-
ally failed because of inadequate funding or
because the criteria were vague or unrelated
to performance (Allan Odden and Carolyn
Kelley 1997).
However, advocates of standards-
based accountability have argued that an
information-age economy requires compen-
sation based on demonstrated skills rather
than narrowly defined jobs. Odden and
Kelley note that today’s teachers have to
perform a variety of tasks, each of which
requires special expertise, such as teaching,
facilitating meetings, coaching, and assess-
ment. Why not compensate them for their
expertise in these areas?
Odden and Kelley identify two major
alternatives to the traditional salary sched-
ule. The first is competency-based pay,
which rewards teachers for demonstrated
skills in teaching, curriculum, and leader-
ship. Some districts and states are already
beginning to provide bonuses to teachers
who pass the rigorous assessment of the
National Board of Professional Teaching
Standards. Other assessments could be
based on standards set by the Interstate
New Teacher Assessment and Support
Consortium (INTASC).
The other alternative is pay for perfor-
mance, which compensates teachers
according to the achievement of their pupils.
Pay for performance is controversial in
theory and exceedingly rare in practice be-
cause it raises a host of practical and
philosophical problems. A seemingly basic
step such as defining “achievement” turns
out to have multiple pathways, and it is
even less clear how (or if) performance can
be adjusted for socioeconomic factors
(Charles Clotfelter and Helen Ladd 1996).
Teachers worry about fairness, argu-
ing that achievement is affected not only by
the quality of instruction but by student mo-
tivation, family support, class size, and
availability of instructional resources.
Therefore, pay-for-performance systems al-
most invariably offer money as special
bonuses added to existing compensation. In
addition, states typically offer rewards to
schools rather than individual teachers
(Boser).
What Incentives Are Applied to
Schools?
Teaching is a collective enterprise; stu-
dent performance on a fourth-grade
assessment depends not just on how well
the fourth-grade teacher has done, but on
what has happened the three prior years.
For that reason, many accountability sys-
tems focus on schools rather than individual
teachers. In Kentucky, for example, schools
exceeding state targets for improved perfor-
mance are awarded money that can be spent
as the faculty determines (Tom Willis and
colleagues 1999).
Another strategy applies sanctions to
schools that consistently perform at a low
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level, replacing the existing management
team with state appointees, or reconstituting
the schools by transferring practitioners or
requiring them to reapply for their posi-
tions. The U.S Department of Education
concluded in 1998 that “there are no conclu-
sive data demonstrating that the threat of
reconstitution is an effective motivator for
change” (Kathryn Doherty and Sarah
Abernathy 1998). Low-performing schools
may have such a long legacy of failure that
simply changing the staff is inadequate.
The American Federation of Teachers
(1998) has supported reconstitution when
done as part of a comprehensive reform ef-
fort. The AFT cited cases such as Corpus
Christi, Texas, where two-thirds of the staff
in low-performing schools were transferred
out (the other third had to reapply), but the
schools were then given extra resources and
attention. By the time of the report, nine of
eleven reconstituted schools were perform-
ing at or above the statewide rate of
improvement.
How Effective Are Incentive
Systems?
Are incentives effective? Reward sys-
tems are new enough and scarce enough
that evidence is very limited. Certainly few
data point to a clear cause-and-effect rela-
tionship between teacher incentives and
student performance. However, incentives
may be one piece of the school-reform
puzzle.
A study by the Consortium for Policy
Research in Education concluded that teach-
ers involved in some form of pay for
performance appeared to have a better un-
derstanding of accountability goals and
greater commitment to them than to other
reform efforts (Carolyn Kelley and col-
leagues). In other words, incentives focused
attention on the goals.
The study also found, however, that
performance-based programs were less ef-
fective when the goals conflicted with other
organizational values, when the bonus was
too small ($600 or less), or when teachers
didn’t believe the money would really be
forthcoming or didn’t believe they could
help students achieve the standards.
Others have noted that even if incen-
tives are motivational, the effects may be
perverse. For example, offering rewards to
individual teachers may lead to competition
at a time when schools are encouraging
teachers to collaborate (Clotfelter and
Ladd). Another unintended effect may be
narrow teaching to the test.
 Finally, while rewards undeniably in-
fluence behavior, human motivation is
complex. “Expectancy” theorists point out
that the actual incentive may be less impor-
tant than the way people perceive it. No
matter how enticing the reward, it will not
motivate teachers who believe they are un-
able to reach the desired goal (Kelley and
colleagues 2000). And while teachers cer-
tainly appreciate money, there is little
evidence that it drives their behavior in the
classroom. They seem more likely to be
gratified by “psychic rewards” such as
small but unmeasurable signs of individual
student progress (Lashway).
What Are the Features of Well-
Designed Incentive Systems?
With some unions now willing to ex-
plore alternative compensation systems,
schools may have a rare opportunity to add
performance elements to their accountability
systems. Many teachers still view incen-
tives with suspicion, however, and districts
should move forward cautiously. Three
guidelines are of particular importance.
First, there must be clear agreement on
the desired results and how they will be
measured (Clotfelter and Ladd). The goal is
not to increase motivation generally but to
focus energy and effort on specific out-
comes (typically state-mandated standards).
Second, there are many ways of apply-
ing incentives, and districts should consider
which options would work best in their
situation. For example, it may be easier to
begin with competency-based pay than with
true performance-based compensation.
Similarly, most researchers strongly recom-
mend basing performance rewards on
school rather than individual performance
(Odden and Kelley; Clotfelter and Ladd).
The Consortium for Policy Research in
Education at the University of Wisconsin
offers online resources on compensation
systems that districts may find helpful
(www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre/tcomp).
Finally, rewards and sanctions do not
provide the kind of silver bullet that will
transform attitudes or jump-start a dysfunc-
tional school. Ultimately, boosting student
achievement requires a comprehensive ap-
proach that includes teacher development,
adequate resources, and organizational sup-
port (Johnson and colleagues; American
Federation of Teachers). Done well, incen-
tives can play a useful supporting role; done
carelessly, they can create dissension that
diverts attention from the central goal of im-
proving student achievement.
RESOURCES
American Federation of Teachers. “Raising
Student Achievement: An Internet Re-
source Guide for Redesigning Low-Per-
forming Schools.” 1998. Available
online at www.aft.org/edissues/rsa/guide/
index.htm
Archer, Jeff. “AFT To Urge Locals To Con-
sider New Pay Strategies.” Education
Week 20, 23 (February 21, 2001):3.
Boser, Ulrich. “Pressure Without Support.”
Quality Counts 2001. A Better Balance:
Standards, Tests, and the Tools to Suc-




Clotfelter, Charles T., and Helen F. Ladd.
“Recognizing and Rewarding Success in
Public Schools.” In Holding Schools Ac-
countable: Performance-Based Reform in
Education, edited by Helen F. Ladd. 23-
63. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings In-
stitution, 1996. ED 396 428.
Doherty, Kathryn, and Sarah Abernathy.
Turning Around Low-Performing
Schools: A Guide for State and Local
Leaders. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Depart-
ment of Education, May 1998. 90 pages.
ED 419 301. www.ed.gov/pubs/turning
Johnson, Henry, and others. A Case Study of
the State of North Carolina’s School-
Based Performance Award Program.
Madison, Wisconsin: Consortium for
Policy Research in Education, 1999.
Available online at www.wcer.wisc.edu/
cpre
Kelley, Carolyn; Allan Odden; Anthony
Milanowski; and Herbert Heneman III.
“The Motivational Effects of School-
Based Performance Awards.” CPRE
Policy Briefs. RB-29 (February 2000). 13
pages. ED 440 473.
Lashway, Larry. The New Standards and Ac-
countability: Will Rewards and Sanctions
Motivate America’s Schools to Peak Per-
formance? Eugene, Oregon: ERIC Clear-
inghouse on Educational Management,
2001. 117 pages.
Odden, Allan, and Carolyn Kelley. Paying
Teachers for What They Know and Do:
New and Smarter Compensation Strate-
gies To Improve Schools. Thousand
Oaks, California: Corwin Press, 1997.
204 pages. ED 414 312.
Watts, James A.; Gale F. Gaines; and Joseph
D. Creech. Getting Results: A Fresh Look
at School Accountability. Atlanta: South-
ern Regional Education Board, 1998. 31
pages. ED 426 510.
Willis, Tom; Kyna Koch; Gretchen Lampe;
Robert Young; Eileen Kellor; and Allan
Odden. A Case Study of the State of
Kentucky’s School-Based Performance
Award Program. Madison, Wisconsin:
Consortium for Policy Research in Edu-
cation, 1999. Available online at
www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre
